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Conservatism is a deeply-imbedded characteristic of the law. "
Reforms come forth slowly and with expressions of regret for the
passing of the old order. Even after they are accomplished
there is a tendency to look back with longing glances and in some
instances to revive the abandoned principles by artificial and
forced construction of statutory changes. - As Pollock figura-
tively phrases it:
"There are few departments of law where some stubborn bit
of archaic form has not stood out, down to times within our own
memory if not to this day, like a pile of ancient rock, weathered
and denuded, but not yet worn down to the level of the plain
where men dwell and work." 3
But withal, conservatism has its proper place in the development
of the law; and even the sociological reformers and critics of the
legal order, sometimes provoked at the failure of the courts to
translate their ambitious programs of uplift into the living law,
may be confidently informed that progress and change are not
synonymous terms in the legal lexicon.
These generalizations come to the surface in a review of the
garnishment of intangible debts in the law of New York. In
this state, as elsewhere, the formative stages of this form of at-
tachment are clouded by fictions and formalism. Gradually but
surely these fictions begin to disappear in the face of the realities
of modern life and the emergencies of business. Yet we may
still detect "some stubborn bit of archaic form" which persists
even down to our own time, some frail form which has outlived
its utility and is tenderly accepted at its face value despite the
reversal of the foundations upon which it rests. Whether the
1 "We work over, adapt and modify, willingly, eagerly; but when it
comes to casting out a whole policy and substituting a new one running
contrary, we are against it, and because of our conservatism, our admira-
tion for and confidence in what has been, we do not make much effort to
find out the merits of the new."-John G. Sargent, Attorney-General of the
United States, address before the New York State Bar Association, N. Y.
L. JouP., Jan. 23, 1926.
2 Twenty years elapsed after the passage of the Negotiable Instruments
Law in New York (Laws, 1897, ch. 612) before its provision that "an sn-
tecedent debt constitutes value" (Laws, 1909, ch. 43, sec. 51) displaced the
contrary common-law doctrine of Coddington v. Bay (1822, N. Y. Sup. Ct)
20 Johns. 637; Kelso & Co. v. Ellis (1918) 224 N. Y. 528, 121 N. E. 06-.
SEssays in the Law (1922) 199.
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necessary readjustments can be made by judicial action, or
whether relief must be sought in legislation, may be debatable.
But the importance of the garnishment process in the Empire
State, with its magnitude of business based upon credits, renders
it imperative to weigh carefully the validity and justice of these
fragile fictions and forms to the end that they may be levelled
to the plane "where men dwell and work".
When we attempt to fix the situs of a debt for purposes of
jurisdiction or attachment, we leave the realms of reality and
deal with fictions. A debt is a chose in action, not a chose in
possession. Confining our analysis to an intangible debt,4 we
do not search out its situs; we frankly confess that we are obliged
to create one.5 And this compulsory attempt to localize the debt
is confused by its bisected form. It is divisible into two parts:
the right of the creditor and the obligation of the debtor. If the
creditor and the debtor reside in different states, the parts are
no longer under the unified authority of one sovereign. Faced
by these peculiar attributes of a debt, it was inevitable that the
courts should endeavor to remove or lessen the resultant entangle-
ments by resort to fictions. A favorite one in the past has been
the fiction that the debt is located at the creditor's domicile, ex-
pressed in the maxim, mobilid sequuntur personam.
Whatever may be the merit or utility of this formula for the
purposes of taxation or administration of debts, this legal as-
sumption has suffered a rather complete eclipse in the rules of
attachment and jurisdiction. In actions between the original
creditor and debtor, the stated fixation of the debt at the credi-
tor's domicile is not in itself sufficient to give jurisdiction over
the debt; the debt is not a res which can be captured at this place
4 This paper and the resultant consideration of intangible debts excludes
the discussion of debts which partake of the qualities of a specialty-
e.g. promissory notes, bonds, etc. The conclusion that the debt is inter-
woven into the instrument itself frequently results in the establishment of
a situs for these debts at the place where the instrument is found for the
purposes of attachment and taxation. Beers v. Shannon (1878) 73 N. Y.
292; Matter of Whiting (1896) 150 N. Y. 27, 44 N. E. 715; Simpson v. The
Jersey Contracting Co. (1900) 165 N. Y. 193, 58 N. E. 896; Lockwood v.
United States Steel Corp. (1913) 209 N. Y. 375, 103 N. E. 697; Erskino v.
Nemours Trad. Corp. (1924) 239 N. Y. 32, 145 N. E. 273; Matter of McMul-
len (1922, 1st Dept.) 199 App. Div. 393, 192 N. Y. Supp. 49; Matter of
Lowell (1924, 1st Dept.) 208 App. Div. 201, 203 N. Y. Supp. 312; Black-
stone v. Miller (1903) 188 U. S. 189, 23 Sup. Ct. 277; Buck v. Beach (1907)
206 U. S. 392, 27 Sup. Ct. 712; Wheeler v. Sohmer (1914) 233 U. S. 434, 34
Sup. Ct. 607. See N. Y. C. P. A. 1921, sec. 916; N. Y. Surro. Ct. Act, sec.
47.
5 For the many divergent views regarding the situs of intangible debts,
see Carpenter, Jurisdiction Over Debts (1918) 31 HARv. L. Rav. 905; of.
Beale, Jurisdiction in Rem to Compel Payment of a Debt (1913) 27 IAnv.
L. Ray. 107.
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without reference to the debtor." Relief must be sought by pur-
suit of the debtor in a direct iz. perso~m u action available at the
latter's domicile- or in a state where he has been personally
served with process., To this extent the fiction that the debt is
imbedded at the domicile of the creditor has been uprooted; and
in its place has been implanted the cardinal principle which
governs the seizure of tangibles, namely, that power to control is
the jurisdictional requisite. And this power over debts--inter
partes at least-involves the debtor as a necessary party, not
because of any nimble fiction regarding the situs of the debt, but
because of the palpable fact that the pocket-book of the debtor
must give forth the satisfaction sought by his creditor9
Turning to the garnishment of intangibles and seeking a situs
wherein a debt may be reached, the same difficulties appear in-
tensified by the tri-partite form of this process. Herein two
rights or obligations are involved, the primary right between the
plaintiff and the defendant, and the subsidiary obligation owing
from the garnishee to the defendant, which is seized by the plain-
tiff and diverted to satisfy the plaintiff's claim. The confusion
attending the exercise of garnishment centers about the nature
and situs of the debt to be garnished. What are the steps to be
taken by the plaintiff to reach this debt owing from the garnishes
to the defendant? In what jurisdiction may the plaintiff insti-
tute garnishment proceedings with the assurance that he has
satisfied the constitutional and common-law requirements of due
process: at the domicile of the principal defendant; where the
defendant is served with process; at the garnishee's domicile; or,
where the garnishee is duly notified by the plaintiff? These
elusive and overlapping questions are frequently arising in New
York law and call for a careful and measured analysis of the
nature and locale of debts for purposes of garnishment.
6 McDonald v. Mabee (1917) 243 U. S. 90, 37 Sup. Ct. 343; BuchaW.G v.
Rueker (1803, K. B.) 9 East, 192; Schwizger v. Hickok (1873) 53 N. Y.
280; Durant v. Abendroth (1884) 97 N. Y. 132; Hanna v. Stedwan (1921)
230 N. Y. 326, 130 N. E. 566; Korman v. Grazd Lodge (1904, Sup. Ct. T. T.)
44 Misc. 564, 90 N. Y. Supp. 120; De Vea:, v. Pachihsk7 (1013, Sup. CL
App. T.) 169 N. Y. Supp. 1039; Szirtes v. Bly (1918, 1st Dept.) 185 App.
Div. 274, 172 N. Y. Supp. 802.
7Schibsby v. Westenholz (1870) L. R. 6 Q. B. 153; Henderson v. S~ ni-
ford (1870) 105 Mass. 504; Hunt v. Hunt (1878) 72 N. Y. 217; Contizental
BanZ. v. Thurber (1893, N. Y. Sup. Ct.) 74 Hun, 032, aff'd (1804) 143 N.
Y. 648, 37 N. E. 828; cf. Grubel v. Nassancr (1913) 210 N. Y. 149, 103 N.
E. 1113; Dicey, Conflict of Laws (2d ed. 1908) 361; Carmody, A. 1. Prac-
tice (1923) sec. 113.
8 See cases in note 6, supra. The writer, of course, is not considering the
jurisdictional requirements of actions in rem or quasi-in-rcm.
9 Blaekstone v. Miller, supra note 4; Frick v. Pcnny'lania (1925) 263
U. S. 463, 45 Sup. Ct. 603; Seefurth, Recent Limitations on the Power to
Impose Inheritance and Estate Taxes (1925) 25 COL. L. Rm. 870.
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Assuming adequate jurisdiction over the defendant and the
garnishee, the constitutionality and efficacy of the attachment of
debts owing from the garnishee to the creditor-defendant is well
established in the case of attachment prior to judgment' and
also in the case of levy upon execution.1 If the defendant in the
main action and the garnishee are both domiciled in New York,
the various theories regarding the situs of the debt to be trusteed
become academic. Whether the debt is considered to be at the
creditor's (defendant's) domicile or at the debtor's (garnishee's)
domicile is immaterial in view of the assumption that both par-
ties are domiciled in New York. The authorities bear out this
initial conclusion.12
The more debatable and dubious parts of the garnishment
process are reached when either the defendant or the garnishee,
or both, are domiciled without New York. Three possible situa-
tions may arise to test the generality of this form of attachment
when one of these elements is involved: (1) when the defend-
ant is domiciled and the garnishee is not domiciled in New York;
(2) when the garnishee is domiciled and the defendant is not
domiciled in New York; and (3) when neither the defendant nor
the garnishee is domiciled in New York.
1. WHEN THE DEFENDANT IS DOMICILED AND THE GARNISHEE
IS NOT DOMICILED IN NEW YORK
If the defendant were suing the garnishee directly, the gar-
nishee being a non-resident, 18 the jurisdiction of New York would
10 N. Y. C. P. A. 1921, 916, 917; Russell v. Ruckman (1854, N. Y. C. P.)
3 E. D. Smith, 419; Wilson v. Duncan (1860, N. Y. Super. Ct.) 11 Abb. Pr.
3; O'Brien v. The Glenville Woolen Co. (1872) 50 N. Y. 128; O'Brien V.
Mechanics & T. Fire Ins. Co. (1874) 56 N. Y. 52; Greentree v. Rosenstook
(1875) 61 N. Y. 583; Hayden v. National Bk. (1891) 130 N. Y. 146, 29 N.
E. 143; Courtney v. Eighth Ward Bank (1898) 154 N. Y. 688, 49 N. E. 54;
Simpson v. Jersey Contracting Co., supra note 4; Amberg v. Manhattan
Life Ins. Co. (1902) 171 N. Y. 314, 63 N. E. 1111; Roseube'rg v. Occidental
Trading Co. (1919) 185 App. Div. 330, 178 N. Y. Supp. 477; Erskhie i. Ne-
mours Trading Co., supra note 4.
'1 N. Y. C. P. A. 1921, sec. 684; Laird v. Carton (1909) 196 N. Y. 169,
89 N. E. 822; Brearley School v. Ward (1911) 201 N. Y. 358, 94 N. E.
1001; Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Encyclopedia Press' (1924) 266 U. S. 285,
45 Sup. Ct. 61.
12 See supra notes 10, 11.
13 The terms "residence" and "domicile" are used interchangeably in the
text. This usage may not be technically accurate. Of. Putnam t'. John-
son (1813) 10 Mass. 488. But it is supported by the settled definitions of
"resident" in the New York Constitution, statutes and decisions. N. Y.
Const., Art. II, gee. 3; Tax Law, sees. 243, 350 (7); Matter of Barry (1900)
164 N. Y. 18, 58 N. E. 12; Matter of Barbour (1919, 1st Dept.) 185 App.
Div. 445, 173 N. Y. Supp. 276, aff'd 226 N. Y. 639, 123 N. E. 854; Matter
of Blankford (1925) 241 N. Y. 180, 149 N. E. 415; see editorial, N. Y. L.
JouR., Dec. 2, 1925; (1926) 35 YALE LAw JOURNAL, 508, and 635.
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be dependent upon satisfactory service on the debtor in the state."
If the garnishee were a foreign corporation, additional proof that
the garnishee expressly- or impliedly0 submitted to the laws of
the place must be furnished before the creditor could validly sub-
ject the foreign corporation to the process of this state. These
basic ingredients must be satisfied as preliminary conditions in
order to reach this same debt by way of attachment; the right
of the plaintiff to garnish is a derivative right which he must
trace out through the defendant. The garnishee being a non-
resident, orthodox principles of the common law' and the con-
stitutional mandate of due process' will prevent the principal
plaintiff from reaching over the head of the defendant and seizing
the latter's credits in the hands of a non-resident garnishee.
And the magic of the maxim, mnobilia sequuntu'r pcrsonwm, which
would fix the situs of the debt at the domicile of the defendant-
creditor, fails to remove the stated requisite that calls for ade-
quate notice to the garnishee within the forum. Reverting to
the statutes, it appears that personal service within the state ih a
condition which must be complied with before the court can pro-
ceed against the non-resident garnishee, whether the garnishee
is a foreign corporation or an individual.
2. WHEN THE GARNISHEE IS DOMICILED AND THE DEFENDANT IS
NOT DOMICILED IN NEW YORK
Dismissing the subsidiary remedy against the garnishee for
the moment, it is to be noted that the plaintiff must first obtain
jurisdiction over the defendant in the stated circumstances.
Since the defendant is a non-resident, the plaintiff must serve
upon the defendant personally in New York, or failing to effeat
actual service, he must attach property of the defendant in the
state. Lacldng personal service or valid attachment, subsequent
proceedings would be coran qzon jzudice, a mere judicial gesture
14 Supra note 6.
15 Stock Corp. Law, sees. 110-114; Smolik v. Philadclphia & Rcad-g C.
& I. Co. (1915, S. D. N. Y.) 222 Fed. 148; Bagdon v. Phi!adclphia & Rcad-
ing C. & L Co. (1916) 217 N. Y. 432, 111 N. E. 1075; Pcn.ymVania Firc
Ins. Co. Q). Gold Issue Min. Co. (1917) 243 U. S. 93, 37 Sup. Ct. 311; ef.
Mechanics & M. Nat. Bk. -v. Banque Izdzstrellc (1923, 1st Dept.) 205 App.
Div. 543, 199 N. Y. Supp. 817; Comcy v. Unitcd Surety Co. (1916) 217 N.
Y. 268, 111 N. E. 832.
46 Old Wayne Mutual Life Ass'n v. McDonough (1907) 204 U. S. 8, 27
Sup. Ct. 236; Simon v. Southemn Ry. (1915) 236 U. S. 115, 35 Sup. Ct.
255; Tauza v. Susquehanna Co. (1917) 220 N. Y. 259, 115 N. E. 915; ef.
Bridges v. Wade (1906, 1st Dept.) 113 App. Div. 350, 99 N. Y. Supp. 126.
3. BUClMnam V. Rucker, upra note 6.
Is Pennoyer v. Neff (1878) 95 U. S. 714; McDonald v. Alabcc, -upra note
6.
1 N. Y. C. P. A. 1921, sees. 684, 917.
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without legality, and offensive to the requirements of due
process.20  Hence in cases where the defendant has not been
served in New York, the valid exercise of the garnishment process
not only subjects the garnishee to the jurisdiction of the court,
but it also draws the defendant into the state to the extent of the
debt attached. But is the debt in New York by virtue of the
garnishee's domicile therein, so that it may be said that the plain-
tiff has seized property of the absent defendant? Not if the
classic formula that the debt follows the creditor is applied to
the present situation, for under this theory the elusive chose in
action would be without the territory and beyond the reach of
the local sovereign. Adhere to this fiction and the main action,
as well as the provisional remedy of garnishment, must fall to
the ground. But the convenient elasticity of fictions comes forth
to prevent this inevitable result of fixing the debt at the domicile
of the creditor. Formalism once more breaks down when the
fiction fails to meet the exigencies of the situation; and we are
told that the general rule that "the situs of debts and obligations
is at the domicile of the creditor" is qualified by the exception
that "the laws of a state, for the purposes of attachment pro-
ceedings, may fix the situs of a debt at the domicile of the
debtor." 21 Still clinging tenaciously to the vanishing fiction that
a debt is domesticated with the creditor, there appears a new
fiction, which places the debt for purposes of garnishment at the
debtor's domicile. The result, it is believed, is sound and in ac-
cord with the basic note of attachment, that power to control
spells out jurisdiction. Since the garnishee is domiciled in New
York, and must be personally notified, this physical factor is
abundantly satisfied. But the unfortunate emphasis upon the
domicile of the debtor and the fictitious assumption that the noted
exception is limited to process directed to the garnishee at this
location portend difficulties to be presently considered.
3. WHEN NEITHER THE DEFENDENT NOR THE GARNISHEE IS
DOMICILED IN NEW YORK
Before attempting the analysis of the New York law in the
stated circumstances, it is in order to note the rule prevailing in
the United States Supreme, 22 Federal, 3 and many State2 4 Courts.
2 o Supra note 18.
21 Douglass v. Phenix Ins. Co. (1893) 138 N. Y. 209, 33 N. E. 938; Na-
tional Broadway Bank v. Sampson (1904) 179 N. Y. 213, 71 N. E. 766.
22 Harris v. Balk (1905) 198 U. S. 215, 25 Sup. Ct. 625; Louisville & N.
RR. v. Deer (1906) 200 U. S. 176, 26 Sup. Ct. 207; Pennington v. Fourth
Nat. Bank (1917) 243 U. S. 269, 37 Sup. Ct. 282.
23Lukrig v. Interstate Coal Co. (1922, S. D. N. Y.) 281 Fed. 265; At-
chison T. & S. Ry. v. Wells (1923) 285 Fed. 369.
24 The prevailing rule, particularly since the decision of Harris V.. Balk,
in the state courts has been in accord with the principles of jurisdiction
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In the leading case of Harris v. Balk.2- the question of the power
of a state court to garnish a debt arising between non-residents
was definitely asked and answered. One Epstein, a resident of
Maryland, started an action against his debtor, Balk, and gar-
nished a debt owing from Harris to Balk, both residents of North
Carolina. Personal service was made upon Harris, the gar-
nishee, in Maryland; and constructive service alone was made
upon Balk, who did not appear to defend. Harris paid to Epstein
the money due Balk, and was later sued by Balk upon the same
debt in North Carolina. To the argument that the debt was
localized at the garnishee-debtor's domicile in North Carolina,
and was therefore not attachable by personal service upon the
garnishee temporarily present in Maryland, the court, per Peck-
ham, J. answered:
"The obligation of the debtor to pay the debt clings to and ac-
companies him wherever he goes. He is as much bound to pay
his debt in a foreign State when therein sued, as he was in the
State where the debt was contracted. We speak of ordinary
debts such as the one in this case. It would be no defence to
such suit for the debtor to plead that he was only in the foreign
State casually or temporarily. His obligation to pay would re-
main the same whether he was there in that way or with an
intention to remain. It is 2zothing but the obligation to pay which
is garnished or attached." 'I;
Thus defined, there is a complete abandonment of the old idea
that domicile, either of the creditor or the debtor, harbors and
determines the situs of a debt for the purpose of attachment. A
debt is migratory, not fixed. It follows the person of the debtor
and can be reached by foreign attachment directed to the gar-
nishee, and this too in the absence of any independent jurisdic-
tion over the principal defendant.
Once more fiction breaks down under pressure of fact, and suc-
cumbs to the central principle governing the attachment of
tangible property with its emphasis upon the power to control as
the prime jurisdictional factor. There is much to be said in favor
of the rule of Harris v. Balk as a solution of the vexatious prob-
lem of the localization of debts. It is directed to the mobility of
debts, a mobility which has increased in these modern times with
space-destroying inventions which have reduced distances and
enunciated therein. National Fire Ins. Co. v. Chambcra (1895) 53 N. J.
Eq. 468, 32 AtL 663; Baltimore & Ohio R. R. r. Adams (1903) 159 Ind. 63S,
66 N. E. 43; Stone v. Drake (1906) 79 Ark. 384, 90 S. W. 197; Wica!cr v'.
American Ins. Co. (1909) 224 Pa. 292, 73 Atl. 443; Bristol v. Brent (1910)
38 Utah, 53, 110 Pac. 356; Starkey v. Clcz'laad, etc. R. R. (1911) 114 Minn.
27, 130 N. W. 540; Leech v. Brown (1915) 172 Iowa, 182, 154 N. W. 440;
Bingenheinwr Co. v. Weber (1922, N. D.) 191 N. W. 620; see also Bec!e.
op. cit. supra note 5, at 118.
2r Supra note 22.
26 Ibid. at 222-223; italics ours.
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erased boundaries. Business is no longer local, but national and
even international, in its scope and ramifications. It seems
rather fantastic to hold to a fiction that a debt is lodged at the
domicile of the debtor, when the fact is that he does not leave his
obligations behind him. Again, commerce and business are con-
ducted upon credit with the resultant substitution of intangible
wealth for tangible property. Can the law hide behind a fiction
in the face of these palpable and important changes in the world
about? Harnis v. Balk has answered these questions in the
negative.
But New York parts company with the United States Supreme
Court when neither the defendant nor the garnishee is domiciled
in the state, and refuses the remedy of garnishment to the plain-
tiff. It rejects the transient qualities of the debt developed in
Harris v. Balk and insists that it is restricted to the domicile of
the creditor or the debtor. In a leading case, Douglass v. Phenix
Insurance Company,27 the Court of Appeals said:
"The general rule is well settled that the situs of debts and
obligations is at the domicile of the creditor. But the attach-
ment laws of our own and of other states recognize the right of a
creditor of a non-resident to attach a debt or credit owing or due
to him by a person within the jurisdiction where the attachment
issues, and to this extent the principle has been sanctioned that
the laws of a state, for the purposes of attachment proceedings,
may fix the situs of a debt at the domicile of the debtor."
With few exceptions 8 the New York decisions continue to accept
the case of Douglass v. Phenix Insurance Company as a true ex-
pression of the nature and situs of debts for the purpose of gar-
nishment.0
-7Supra note 21. In this case the plaintiff, a resident of New York,
sued the defendant, a domestic corporation, upon a claim arising out of a
policy of insurance. The defendant pleaded in abatement that it was
carrying on business and maintaining an agency in Massachusetts under
license granted by that state; that, pursuant to the laws therein, it had
appointed an attorney in the state for the acceptance of service; that prior
to the commencement of the suit in New York, an action was brought
against the plaintiff by his creditors in Massachusetts, in which action the
defendant insurance company was made a party as trustee, was duly served
and the debt owing to its New York creditor garnished. It was further
alleged that this action in Massachusetts was pending and that Massa-
chusetts had thereby acquired full jurisdiction over the attached debt.
The demurrer to this plea was sustained.
28 See infra notes 67, 68, 69.
29 Carr v. Corcoran (1899, 1st Dept.) 44 App. Div. 97, 60 N. Y. Supp.
763; Allen v. United Cigar Stores Co. (1902, Sup. Ct. T. T.) 39 Misc. 500,
80 N. Y. Supp. 401; National Broadway Bk. v. Sampson, supra note 21;
Bridges v. Wade, supra note 16; Morris Plan Co. v. Miller (1918, Sup, Ct.,)
102 Misc. 470, 169 N. Y. Supp. 37.
The latest case which accepts and applies the doctrine of Douglasa V.
Phenix Ins. Company is Cohn v. Enterprise Dist. Corp. (App. Div., lat
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The three formulas behind the New York law may be para-
phrased in the terms of Douglass v. Pheni.: Insurance Conipanty9
as follows:
(1) The debt is fixed at the domicile of the creditor or the
debtor for purposes of attachment.5
(2) A foreign corporation has "its exclusive residence and
domicile in the jurisdiction of origin" and, therefore, it cannot be
garnished in another jurisdiction so as to make the attachment
effectual against its creditor in the absence of jurisdiction ac-
quired over the person of such creditor." '
(3) If, under the circumstances stated in (2), a sister state
issues a judgment against the foreign garnishee-corporation, New
York may disregard this judgment as offensive to the course of
common-law jurisdictional requirements.-'
As to the first and third contentions, the stated restrictions ex-
tend to both non-resident individuals" and to foreign corpora-
tions,35 when served as garnishees outside their respective dom-
iciles. The second limitation obviously is referable only to
corporate entities. It is purposed to examine the validity and
justice of the procedural fictions which (1) localize the debt at
the domicile of the creditor or the debtor, (2) confine a foreign
corporation to its domicile of origin, and (3) refuse extra-terri-
torial effect to judgments issued in defiance to these jurisdictional
inhibitions.
I
Keeping in mind that New York has abandoned the rigid rule
that a debt is imbedded at the domicile of the creditor-defendant
when the defendant is a non-resident and the garnishee is dom-
iciled in New York,3' there remains no valid reason for the limi-
tation that the garnishee must be domiciled at the forum if satis-
factory and direct service in personaza is made upon the latter
outside of his domiciliary abode. It is too late for Neew York
to argue that a garnishable debt calls for jurisdiction over the
persons of the creditor and the debtor, an argument consistently
Dept., N. Y. L. JouR., Nov. 30, 1925. See Kennedy, Jurisdiction Orer Debts,
N. Y. L. JouR., Dec. 21, 1925.
30 Supra notes 21, 27.
3'Supra note 21, at 219.
2Ibid. at 220-224.
,33Ibid. at 221.
4Ibid.; National Broadway Bank v. Sampson, snpra note 21; Carr v.
Corcoran, supra note 29.
zsDouglass v. PhenLi Ins. Co., supra note 21, at 221; Allen Z'. ronitcd
Cigar Stores Co., supra note 29; Cohn v. Entcrprise Dist. Corp., ampra
note 29.
r Supra note 21.
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and ably made by Professor Beale- and persuasively answered
by Professor Carpenter.3 8 The injustice, if any, in the operation
bf Harris v. Balk39 results. from the seizure and payment of a
credit belonging to the non-resident defendant after constructive
notice. It is not conceivable that the garnishee has any ground to
complain, if he is personally protected and served within the
jurisdiction of attachment proceedings, whether he is domiciled
there or not. Yet this is the very effect of the New York rule-if
the garnishee is domiciled in New York, an incident of no effect
in removing the alleged injustice against the non-resident defend-
ant, the credit of the absent defendant is seized and sold; if the
garnishee is not domiciled herein, the same credit is immune from
attachment. Assuming, as is frequently the case, that the plain-
tiff in the main action is a resident of New York, the rather start-
ling situation follows: A resident plaintiff's access to a credit
owing to a non-resident defendant from a non-resident garnishee
(even when the latter is personally served in the state) is depend-
ent, not upon the justice or injustice of the garnishment process
as it affects the non-residents, one or both, but solely upon the
mythical situs of the debt garnished at the domicile of the debtor.
And moreover, the resident plaintiff discovers that this fiction
is not only potent enough to defeat ancillary relief, but is like-
wise destructive of jurisdiction over the defendant in the main
action.4°
As a vehicle of justice, it is submitted that the fiction which
solidifies the debt at the garnishee's domicile is unduly, although
unintentionally, favorable to non-resident defendants, correspond-
ingly unfair to plaintiffs (particularly resident plaintiffs)
privileged to sue in New York, and without merit with reference
to the rights of the garnishee, the very person whose status ad-
mits or defeats garnishment. Nor can the blame be placed at the
doors of the Legislature; the statutes4' and the admissions of the
37 Supra note 5.
38 Supra note 5.
39 Supra note 22. This possible injustice to the non-resident is mitigated
in Harris v. Balk by the provision that the right of the garnishee to avail
himself of the prior judgment and payment to the principal plaintiff, when
sued by the non-resident defendant, is conditioned upon the garnishee's
notification to the non-resident of the pendency of the garnishment pro-
ceedings.
The claim of the garnishee that he is discommoded, his property and
contract rights invaded, by the garnishment writ is without merit. Midi-
cott Johnson Corp. v. Encyclopedia Press, supra note 11.
40 Cohn v. Enterprise Dist. Corp., supra note 29.
41 N. Y. C. P. A. 1921, secs. 684, 916, 917. No limitation is imposed
by these sections beyond personal notice to the garnishee in New York.
The qualification that the garnishee must be domiciled in the state is
wholly absent. People v. St. Nicholas Bk. (1899, 1st Dept.) 44 App. Div.
313, 60 N. Y. Supp. 719; Weil v. Gallun (1902, 1st Dept.) 75 App. Div. 439,
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judges 2 lend force to the conclusion that this insistent adherence
to domicile as a jurisdictional test of garnishment is purely ju-
dicial in origin. Passing the question whether the source from
which the fiction came should be privileged to revise it without
legislative aid (and the writer believes that there are ample
grounds for an affirmative answer)43 it is hardly conceivable-
especially in a commercial state where credit is interwoven into
the ideas of property and wealth, where the bulk of the business
of America is localized, where non-residents, individual and cor-
porate, enjoy the commercial advantages on the same plane as
residents--that the legal fiction that a debt is only attachable or
garnishable at the domicile of the debtor-garnishee can perma-
nently endure.
The fiction that a foreign corporation is a thoroughly domesti-
cated entity and that it has "its exclusive residence and domicile
in the jurisdiction of origin" deserves separate consideration, as
a restrictive doctrine in the law of attachment of intangible debts.
If this fiction is unsound with reference to the residence of corpo-
rate garnishees, if the nomadic activities of modern life penetrate
the veil of corporate existence and disclose that these corpora-
tions are in fact abroad in the land, leading a double or multiple
life, another cornerstone of Douglass v. Phenix I2surance Com-
pany is undermined, another fiction fades away under the illumi-
nating facts of modern commercial life. And New York may
gracefully apply this altered concept of dual or multiple residence
as an adequate basis for reaching foreign-born corporations by
way of garnishment, without the necessity of executing a turn-
about-face in its prior holding that the debt is located at the
residence of the corporation.
The fiction that a corporation leads a cloistered and solitary
78 N. Y. Supp. 300; Starke v. Beckwith Special Agency (1919) 227 N. Y.
42, 124 N. E. 96.
4-Douglass v. Phenix Ins. Co., supra note 21, at 221-222; Plbaptwn v.
Bigelow (1883) 93 N. Y. 592, semble; Carr v. Corcoranz, supra note 29, at
764; ef. note 2, supra.
43 The temperate and moderate judicial review of former decisions, when
past precedents are clearly inapplicable to modern conditions, and their
readjustment to meet the changing social order, may be noted in New
York law. People v. Schweinler Press (1915) 214 N. Y. 395, 103 N. E.
639; Klein v. Maravelas (1916) 219 N. Y. 383, 114 N. E. 809; Epstein ,v.
Gluckin (1922) 233 N. Y. 490, 135 N. E. 861; Oppenheltm v. Kridcl (1923)
236 N. Y. 156, 140 N. E. 227.
But ef. Sun Print. Co. v. Remington P. & P. Co. (1923) 235 N. Y. 338,
139 N. E. 470; Imperator Realty Co. -v. ThU (1920) 228 N. Y. 447, 127 N. E.
263; C-owley v. Lewis (1925) 239 N. Y. 264, 143 N. E. 374; Cammac!: v.
Slattery (1925) 241 N. Y. 39, 148 N. E. 781.
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life in the state that gave it birth and that it cannot be reached
by process outside of the state of its incorporation came into
New York law by force of a dictum in Matter of McQueen v.
Middleton Manufacturing Company" to the effect that "the
process against a corporation must be served on its head, or prin-
cipal officer, within the jurisdiction of the sovereignty where the
artificial body exists." This dictum played a prominent part in
shaping the early law of other jurisdictions. 45 But the answer
to this narrow doctrine had been made many years before its
qualified revival in the Douglass case;4c and in the meantime,
New York found no insuperable difficulty in upholding statutes
which nullified the "eternal principle" that a corporation could
not be served with process outside of the chartering state. 47
Moreover, New York had consistently held since 1873 that foreign
insurance companies, which seek and receive permission to do
business in the state, "must be regarded as domiciled here" at
least "as to business transacted" 48 in New York. But the prin-
ciple of the singleness of corporate residence persisted in other
phases of corporation law .49 Thus in the evolution of New York
44 (1819, N. Y. Sup. Ct.) 16 Johns. 5.
4 Peckham. v. North Parish (1834, Mass.) 16 Pick. 274; Middlebrooks v.
Springfield Fire Ins. Co. (1841) 14 Conn. 301; Henderson, The Position of
Foreign Corporations in American Constitutional Law (1918) 79.
46Moulin v. Trenton Mutual Life In. Co. (1855) 25 N. J. L, 57; St.
Clair v. Cox (1882) 106 U. S. 350, 1 Sup. Ct. 354.
47Hiller v. Boston & Maine R. R. (1877) 70 N. Y. 223; Pope v. Terre
Haute Car Co. (1881) 87 N. Y. 137.
48 Martine v. International Life Ins. Soc. (1873) 53 N. Y. 339; Morgan v.
Mutual Life Ins. Co. (1907) 189 N. Y. 447, 82 N. E. 438; Comey v. United
Surety Co., supra. note 15.
Sed quere, whether the right to sue foreign insurance companies, licensed
to do business and actually doing business therein, should be restricted
to causes of action arising out of business done in New York. N. Y. Insur-
ance Law, sec. 9, 30; cf. Stock Corp. Law, sec. 110, 111; note 15, supra.
49 The question of the domicile or residence of a foreign corporation
arose in connection with the defence of the Statute of Limitations. Could
a foreign corporation having property, offices and officials, and doing busi-
ness in New York without a license invoke the aid of this statute when
sued in New York? The law of New York excepted from the time limited
for the commencement of an action the period during which the defendant
was absent from the state. N. Y. C. P. A. 1921, sec. 19; C. C. P., sec. 401;
Code Proc., sec. 100. Construing this section, it was held that a foreign
corporation en necessitate was always absent from the state, since it dwelt
only in the state of origin, and therefore, it could never seek refuge in
the defence of the Statute of Limitations. Olcott v. Tioga R. R. (1859)
20 N. Y. 210; Rathburrn v. North Carolina R. R. (1872) 50 N. Y. 656;
Boardman v. Lake Shore & Mich. S. Ry. (1881) 84 N. Y. 157. The anomaly
of locating a foreign corporation, for procedural purposes, permanently
outside of New York in defiance of the patent facts, and then calmly pro-
ceeding to try the same cause of action against the foreign corporation
in its courts has not escaped criticism. Tioga R. R. v. Blossburg & Corn-
ing R. R. (1873, U. S.) 20 Wall. 137, 143, 152. In Comey v. United Surety
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law governing jurisdiction over foreign corporations there are
two violently contrasted principles contesting for the mastery.
One rule justified iervice upon a foreign corporation even when
it did no business, had no offices or property in New York pro-
vided only that the proper official had been served within the state.
And the mere fact that the official served was not upon the busi-
ness of the corporation or was upon a pleasure trip made no
difference in drawing the foreign corporation into New York for
the purposes of suit. 0  The other rule denied that a foreign
corporation could be present in New York even when it did busi-
ness, owned property and maintained offices in the jurisdiction."'
Faced by these parallel and inconsistent theories of corporate
residence, the problem came forth in another form in Douglass
v. Phenikx Insurance Company with reference to the situs of cor-
porations for the purpose of attachment.1;- In view of the gen-
eral breakdown of the dictum enunciated in Matter of McQUCCte
v. Middleton Manufacturing Coin pany" nearly three-quarters of
a century before the Douglass case, the liberal interpretation of
New York statutes regarding service upon foreign corporations,'
especially with reference to foreign insurance corporations," and
particularly because of statutory permission which allowed the
courts to reach a foreign corporation by garnishment under the
stated conditions,cG it would seem that the time had arrived for
New York to recognize the jurisdiction of a state over a foreign
corporation, doing business under license of the state, to the point
of garnishment of intangible debts owing to non-residents of the
Co., supra note 15, the Court of Appeals refused to extend this untenable
doctrine to the case of a foreign insurance corporation licensed to do
business in New York. As to this corporation, the Court said, per Cardozo,
J.: "We think that a foreign corporation thus licensed under our own
laws may not with reason be held to be absent from our state. It owes
to the law of its creation its franchise to be a corporation; but it owes
to the law of this state the privilege of doing business within our borders.
In exercising that privilege it may be dealt with as if it were in truth a
domestic corporation. . . . We hold, therefore, that the defendant has
the right, like a domestic corporation, to take advantage of the defense
that the action was not begun in time." 217 N. Y. at 274, 276, 111 N. E.
at 834.
50 Supra note 47. These earlier and untenable views of jurisdiction over
foreign corporations not doing business in New York are now discarded.
Dollar Co. v. Canadian C. & F. Co. (1917) 220 N. Y. 270, 115 N. E. 711.
But the change was not due to any voluntary action of the New York
courts; they yielded to the contrary views of the United States Supreme
Court. Dan River Cotton Mills v. Menefee (1915) 237 U. S. 189, 35 Sup.
Ct. 579.
Z Supra note 49.
2 Supra note 27.
53 Supra notes 44, 46.
:4 Supra note 47.
5 Supra, note 48.
56 Supra note 41.
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forum. Moreover, New York had already accepted by clear dicta
the justice of this extension of the garnishment process." But
the shades of Matter of McQueen v. Middldton Manufacturing
Company still stalked about and the antiquated notion of cor-
porate domicile prevailed.- There are grounds for the belief that
this discredited fiction will be squarely repudiated when it is pre-
sented to the Court of Appeals.,; Until then, it provides an apt
illustration of Pollock's criticism; it is a "stubborn bit of archaic
form" which still stands out in New York law.
III
The positive declaration in the Douglass case 0 that New York
is not bound to recognizethe judgment of a sister state issued
against a foreign garnishee in the absence of jurisdiction over the
principal defendant, even though personal service is accomplished
upon the garnishee in the forum, must now be deemed to be over-
ruled by force of the full faith and credit demanded of this judg-
ment by Harris v. Balk.0 ' Concededly New York may still refuse
to take jurisdiction over foreign garnishees within the state, des-
pite the constitutional integrity of jurisdiction thus exercised.
But it cannot withhold recognition from a foreign judgment of
another state similarly obtained.0 2 Nor is the effect of Harris
v. Balk limited to its decree of inviolability in the case of extra-
territorial judgments against non-resident garnishees. The New
York decisions press down upon the "embarrassing conflict of
jurisdictions" that would follow the localization of a debt with a
foreign corporation doing business in several states.03  This fear
is no longer formidable in view of the protection accorded to the
foreign corporation after paying its debt according to the terms
of Harris v. Bixlk. Another objection raised in the Douglass de-
cision was the commendable one that the suggested expansion of
garnishment would "subject creditors of domestic corporations to
great prejudice." 04 This was true in cases where domestic cor-
porations doing business abroad were subjected to the garnish-
ment process, thus depriving local creditors of their credits by
actions begun in other states. But New York must now accept
57 Plimpton v. Bigelow, supra note 42, at 601.
58 Supra, note 32.
5 Supra, notes 48, 49; Lockwood v. United States Steel Corp., supra
note 4; James & Co. v. Second Russian Reinsurance Co. (1925) 239 N. Y.
248, 146 N. E. 369; cf. Russian Reinsurance Co. v. Stoddard (1925) 240
N. Y. 149, 147 N. E. 703.
60 Supra note 33.
61 Supra note 22.
6
2 Drake v. De Silva (1908, 3d Dept.) 124 App. Div. 95, 108 N. Y. Supp.
1039.
63 Douglass v. Phenix Ins. Co., supra, note 21, at 220; National Bank v.
Sampson, supra note 21, at 225.
64 Ibid. at 220.
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the result of Harris v. Balk which permits these credits to be di-
verted from the creditors of New York corporations. Moreover,
the present New York rule in action has resulted in the penaliz-
ing of local creditors in their pursuit of attachable assets of non-
resident defendants.c
Concluding the survey of the present validity of the three un-
derlying contentions of Dou'glass r. Phenix.. Iw.raace Conlpany,f
it may be said that one principle alone holds back the entry of
Harris c. Balk into New York: the fiction that an intangible debt
has an irremovable situs at the domicile of the creditor or the
debtor when its attachment is sought. And even this persistent
doctrine is being weighted with limitations that evince a readiness
to abandon it upon rather slender and apparently unsound dis-
tinctions. Thus, an attachment of a debt owing from a foreign
garnishee to a non-resident has been permitted if the debt arose
out of a contract made and payable,-- or performed in New Yor!,kF
or if the business which gave rise to the debt originated in the
state. ' While these decisions are pointed in the right direction,
in that they invade the heretofore inflexible axiom that the debt
is fixed at the domicile of the creditor or the debtor, the inference
that the place of contract, payment, or performance in itself spelh
out a situs of the debt is somewhat debatable. These incidents
are essential in determining contractual rights, but it is question-
able whether they can justify the exercise of rem edkCs generally
denied. If New York still insists, as it does, that the situs of the
debt is determined by domicile, and therefore not attachable when
the defendant and the garnishee are non-residents, the mere malt-
ing of the contract, or its performance, in New Yorl: should not
shift its situs to this state.-, The truth is that personal and
direct control over the garnishee within the state was the prime
jurisdictional factor in these cases; and the emphasis upon col-
lateral elements served to postpone the full force of this ultimate
adjudication.
In conclusion, it is submitted that New York should remove this
remaining "bit of archaic form" which links and restricts the gar-
C5 "The courts of this state were primarily for the residents of this
state. There must be some forceful and controllin- reason entering into
the very nature and essence of the action which would close their doors
to its own citizens." Gregonis v. Philadclphia & Rcadbig Coal Co. t192:3
235 N. Y. 152, 159, 139 N. E. 223, 225.
, Se'prc notes 31, 32, 33.
'7 La ?cater v. Sp,)t.,,vood (103, Sup. Ct. Spec. T.) 41 MIisc. 19, 8" "I. Y.
Stpp. 572.
SFln v. W74fte (1907, 1st Dept.) 122 App. Div. 780, 107 N. Y. Supp.
S0.
'India Rcbber Co. v. Katz (1901, 1st Dept.) 65 App. Div. 349, 72 N. Y.
Supp. 65S; cf. Mecihanics & .11. Bank v. Banqzc Izdistriclle, -;tpra note 15.
' Harris v. Balk, spra note 37, at 222; Tauzez v. Szt3quchaane_ Coal Co.,
j:ro note 16, semble.
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nishment of intangible delts to the domicile of creditor or debtor.
This fiction is not-demanded by the constitutional provisions of
due process, nor is it imposed upon the courts by legislative man-
date. Tested in the scales of justice-which is the sole warrant
for the continuance of its fictitious existence-it is arbitrary and
unfair to plaintiffs, generally New York citizens or domestic cor-
porations, and unduly mindful of the interests of non-resident
defendants and garnishees. Tested in terms of the emergencies
and tendencies of the time, this static idea of domicile as a sort
of safe-deposit vault for intangible debts is a curious relic in the
midst of the fluidity of modern business with its interstate trans-
actions, extension of credit and transient agencies. Assuming
direct notice to the non-resident garnishee in the forum and
ample opportunity to the non-resident defendant to protect his
rights when served by publication-and these essentials are
already insured by the existing statutes of New York71 and the
restrictive provisions of Harris v. Balk 72-a plaintiff should be
given free access to this intangible asset by way of garnishment
without reference to the fading fiction of domicile.
721 N. Y. C. P. A. 1921, sees. 217, 493, 819.
72 Supra note 39.
